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ABSTRACT 
 
Not all researchers interested in human behavior remain convinced that modern neuroimaging 
techniques have much to contribute to distinguishing between competing cognitive models for 
explaining human behavior, especially if one removes reverse inference from the table. Here, we took 
up this challenge in an attempt to distinguish between two competing accounts of the problem size 
effect (PSE), a robust finding in investigations of mathematical cognition. The PSE occurs when people 
solve arithmetic problems and indicates that numerically large problems are solved more slowly and 
erroneously than small problems. Neurocognitive explanations for the PSE can be categorized into 
representation-based and process-based views. Behavioral and traditional univariate neural measures 
have struggled to distinguish between these accounts. By contrast, a representational similarity 
analysis (RSA) approach with fMRI data provides competing hypotheses that can distinguish between 
accounts without recourse to reverse inference. To that end, our RSA (but not univariate) results 
provided clear evidence in favor of the representation-based over the process-based account of the 
PSE in multiplication; for addition, the results were less clear. Post-hoc similarity analysis distinguished 
still further between competing representation-based theoretical accounts. Namely, data favored the 
notion that individual multiplication problems are stored as individual memory traces sensitive to input 
frequency over a strictly magnitude-based account of memory encoding. Together, these results 
provide an example of how human neuroimaging evidence can directly inform cognitive-level 
explanations of a common behavioral phenomenon, the problem size effect. More broadly, these data 
may expand our understanding of calculation and memory systems in general. 
 
Highlights 
•The problem-size effect (PSE) is a common and robust behavioral effect in arithmetic 
•Univariate fMRI does not but RSA does differentiate cognitive accounts of the PSE 
•RSA data show problems are stored as memory traces sensitive to input frequency 
•Data were inconsistent with a strictly magnitude-based account of memory encoding 
•Human fMRI data can directly inform cognitive explanations of behavioral phenomena 
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INTRODUCTION 
The problem size effect (PSE) is a well-known phenomenon in mental-arithmetic and probably the 
most studied effect in the history of mathematical cognition (e.g., Ashcraft, 1992; Campbell & Xue, 
2001; Zbrodoff & Logan, 2005). Problems with large operands (8 + 9, 6 x 8) take longer to solve and 
produce more errors than problems with small operands (4 + 2; 3 x 4; Zbrodoff & Logan, 2005). At the 
neural level, the PSE has been examined primarily using univariate approaches, identifying various 
regions that show differences in univariate activity as a function of problem size, with increased activity 
for large compared to small problems in a large network of frontal, parietal and temporal regions (De 
Smedt et al., 2011; Jost et al., 2011; Grabner et al., 2013; Prado et al., 2013; Menon, 2015, for a review). 
As it is a robust effect that characterizes much of arithmetic processing, understanding the 
mechanisms that underpin the PSE can also expand our understanding of how the brain achieves 
simple arithmetical processing. 
Cognitive explanations of the PSE tend to fall broadly into two different categories, which 
could be labeled as representation-based and processing-based accounts (Ashcraft & Guillaume, 2009). 
Behavioral and traditional univariate approaches to fMRI data have struggled to distinguish between 
these two competing accounts without recourse to reverse inference (Coltheart, 2006; Anderson, 
2014). The present study uses human neuroimaging data to distinguish between these two accounts 
of the PSE via representational similarity analysis (RSA; Kriegeskorte et al., 2008; Davis & Poldrack, 
2013). Rather than looking at the difference in neural activation between conditions, RSA allows one 
to look at the relative similarity in spatial patterns of neural activation within conditions. Interestingly 
and key to the current study, the representation-based account and processing based account make 
competing predictions on the similarity in spatial patterns of brain activity for small and large 
problems, as we elaborate in more detail below. 
Representation-based accounts focus on how arithmetic facts are stored or represented in 
memory, and on the various factors that impact the representation and retrieval of this memory trace 
(e.g., Ashcraft, 1987; Siegler & Shrager, 1984; Campbell, 1995). In general, this view predicts that the 
representations of small problems will be more precise and less overlapping than the representations 
of large problems. Within the representation-based account, there are various explanations for this 
difference in representational overlap between small and large problems. One such explanation 
focuses on the order and frequency with which arithmetic problems are learned and practiced. More 
frequently taught problems (i.e., small problems) are predicted to have a higher strength of 
representation and are consequently more distinctive (i.e., less overlapping). This distinctiveness is 
also characterized by a recent history comprising fewer erroneous retrievals (Siegler & Shrager, 1984), 
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leading to a more ‘peaked distribution of associations’ (between stimulus and correct response), which 
in turn implies greater likelihood of retrieving the correct answer. By contrast, larger problems are 
learned later and encountered and practiced less frequently. As a result, they are stored in memory 
less distinctively with greater overlap in memory traces. Large problems will have a more widely spread 
distribution of associations due to a greater history of errors – i.e., a given problem is linked to a greater 
number of answers or outputs with a broader or less peaked distribution around the correct answer. 
Larger problems with a widely-spread distribution of associations will be solved more slowly and more 
erroneously because the correct answer is likely to achieve retrieval threshold less efficiently (Ashcraft, 
1987; Ashcraft & Christy, 1995; McCloskey & Lindemann, 1992). 
A second explanation within the representation-based account explains the PSE by recourse 
to representations of problem magnitude (Campbell, 1995). Specifically, a widespread ‘tuning-curves’ 
model of magnitude representation posits that larger quantities are represented less precisely, such 
that the representations of two large quantities (e.g., 8 and 9) are expected to overlap to a greater 
extent than two smaller quantities (e.g., 1 and 2), holding distance constant (Piazza et al., 2004; Lyons 
et al., 2015). In his network interference model of arithmetic facts, Campbell (1995) proposed that 
greater representational overlap for large problems in turn results in greater interference – and hence 
worse performance – on large relative to small problems. 
Processing-based accounts focus on the various processes – typically in the form of different 
strategies – that are used to solve small and large problems (e.g., LeFevre et al., 1996; Campbell & Xue, 
2001). In this account, small problems tend to rely on very similar processing strategies, such as fact 
retrieval. Large problems, on the other hand, are predicted to be solved by procedural strategies, 
which consists of a much more diverse set of processing strategies, such as decomposing a problem in 
a series of other problems [e.g., 8 × 7 can be decomposed into (72) + 7], rounding [e.g., 9 × 7 = (10 × 7) 
–7], transforming [e.g., 8 × 5 = 2 × (4 × 5)], and even counting. This account predicts that there should 
be greater similarity when processing small problems, as they involve more similar solution strategies; 
larger problems should be less similar due to a more heterogeneous set of processing strategies. 
It is important to note that, with respect to the PSE, both representation and process-based 
accounts make similar predictions for behavior (poorer performance on larger relative to smaller 
problems) and univariate analysis of neural data (greater activity for large relative to small problems). 
One might make differing predictions for the different views with regard to observing the PSE in 
different sets of brain regions; however, it is difficult to see how to do this without obvious (and hence 
problematic) recourse to reverse inference. Crucially, however, representation-based and processing-
based accounts make competing predictions with respect to similarity of patterns of neural responses 
for small and large problems even within the same brain region (thus largely circumventing the issue 
of reverse inference). Specifically, as reviewed above, Representation-based views posit that the 
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representations of individual numerically small problems (2 + 1, 3 × 4) are relatively distinct from one 
another, with more narrowly tuned distributions due to less overlapping representations. 
Consequently, the neural similarity of distributed patters of neural activity among small-problems 
should be low. Large-problems (8 + 9, 6 × 8) elicit broader, more overlapping distributions, and should 
thus show relatively high neural similarity with one another. If a given brain area shows greater 
similarity for large relative to small problems, this would provide support for a representation-based 
account of the PSE. By contrast, Processing-based accounts of the PSE rely on the notion that small-
problems are solved via a narrow range of highly consistent strategies, which should lead to high 
similarity values among small-problems. Large-problems, being solved by a wider range of more 
variegated strategies should yield lower similarity values with one another. If a given brain area shows 
greater similarity for small relative to large problems, this would provide support for a processing-
based account. To conclude, RSA allows us to characterize the manner in which each brain area’s 
response corresponds to one PSE account or the other (or neither) based on its own pattern of neural 
responses, rather than relying on reverse inference (Poldrack, 2011; Davis & Poldrack, 2013). This 
approach can thus provide clear elucidation of the neurocognitive mechanisms underlying the PSE that 
is difficult to obtain in behavioral or traditional univariate approaches (Coltheart, 2006).   
We assessed the PSE in multiplication and addition mental arithmetic. Behavioral data were 
acquired prior to scanning; fMRI data were acquired in a manner that isolated arithmetic computation 
from response-selection. Univariate contrasts were used to establish whether a given region was 
sensitive to relative problem-size. RSA was then used to assess how the underlying neural patterns 
were modulated by problem-size. Specifically, for multiplication and addition separately, we assessed 
the similarity among small-problems and the similarity among large-problems to test the 
abovementioned competing predictions. To summarize: Regions consistent with a representation-
based account should show greater similarity among large- relative to small-problems; regions 
consistent with a process-based account of the PSE should show greater similarity among small- 
relative to large-problems.  
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METHODS 
Participants 
Thirty adults from Ghent University participated in the experiment (22 female, mean age = 24yrs, 
range: 18-27yrs, all right-handed). All participants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision and 
reported no history of neurological or psychiatric illness. Prior to taking part in the study, participants 
gave written consent and all participants were paid €40 for their participation. The study was approved 
by the Medical Ethical Committee of Ghent University and Ghent University Hospital.  
Due to movement artifacts (4 participants), technical acquisition problems (1 participant) and 
diagnosis of dyslexia and dyscalculia (1 participant), 6 participants in total were excluded from further 
analyses, leaving a final sample of 24 participants. 
Procedure 
All experiments were controlled by E-Prime (Psychology Software Tools, Pittsburg, PA) and displayed 
on a 1600 x 900-resolution screen. Participants performed an arithmetic task both prior to and during 
scanning. The computer was placed on average 50 cm in front of the participant for the behavioral 
task. In the scanner, the experiment was presented using a Brainlogics 200MR digital projector, which 
was visible via a mirror attached to the head coil, with a viewing distance of 120cm.  
Tasks 
We should note that the data reported here are part of a larger dataset; all results reported here are 
unique and address hypotheses that do not overlap with prior publications arising from this dataset 
(Tiberghien et al., 2019). Both the pre-scan and fMRI arithmetic tasks included three operations: 
multiplication, addition and subtraction.1 Operation order was fully randomized across participants, 
so the presence of subtraction problems should not yield systematic biases when considering just the 
multiplication and addition problems. 
Pre-Scan Arithmetic Task 
The pre-scan arithmetic task was a production task (i.e., a task where the participant needed to 
generate the answer) containing all permutations of two operands ranging from 0 to 10 (121 total 
problems) with three different arithmetic operations: addition, multiplication and subtraction 
(resulting in a grand total of 363 problems). All problems were presented once, with order randomized 
                                                 1 Subtraction was included for analysis projects not immediately related to the hypotheses being tested here. In 
particular, here we restrict the focus exclusively on multiplication and addition because it is not always clear 
whether the PSE in subtraction should consider the solution size or the operand size. This is doubly problematic 
in the current study, as all three operations were equated in terms of operands, meaning that, for instance, the 
‘large’ operands in 9–8 generate  a ‘small’ solution (1). Moreover, half of the subtraction problems yielded 
negative solutions. In multiplication and addition, this is not an issue because solutions will never be negative 
(all operands ≥ 0), and the solutions to problems with large operands will always be larger than problems with 
small operands. 
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across participants. A trial started with a fixation (i.e., three squares) presented for 3000msec followed 
by the arithmetic problem. The problem remained on the screen until the participant responded. Once 
the participant has said the response out loud, a voice-key recorded the onset of speech. Then, the 
experimenter recorded the response of the participant and recorded if the voice-key triggered 
correctly. That is, another sound (e.g., “ehm” or a cough) sporadically triggered the voice-key. If indeed 
the voice-key was falsely triggered on a certain problem, that problem reappeared later in the 
experiment. The inter-trial-interval was 1000msec. This procedure was repeated until the participant 
had solved all 363 problems with a valid registration of voice-key reaction time for each problem. 
Intermittent breaks were given after every 33 trials.  
Arithmetic Task – fMRI Version 
The arithmetic task inside the scanner was kept as similar to the pre-scan version as possible: all 
problems ranging from 0 to 10 were used in addition, multiplication and subtraction, resulting in a 
grand total of 363 problems. Trials were divided as evenly as possible across 6 separate runs, with trial 
(and hence also run) order randomized across participants. As in the pre-scan task, a trial started with 
a fixation presented for 3000msec followed by the first arithmetic problem. Here, the problem (e.g., 9 
× 8) remained on the screen for 2600msec. Our goal was to separate the mental calculation aspects of 
arithmetic processing from response preparation and execution. Participants were instructed to 
mentally compute the answer during this period. For most trials, the problem was then replaced by 
fixation. For 10 percent of trials, a response was required, in which case the problem was replaced by 
two response possibilities for 1500msec. One number was the correct response, while the other 
number was the correct response +/-1. Participants pressed either a left or a right key (with left or 
right index finger) to indicate which was the correct answer. This was followed by fixation. Inter-trial 
interval was jittered (range = 1000 – 8194msec, mean = 3421msec) for all trials. Response events were 
modeled as events of no interest. 
Accuracy for problems of the scanner-task was high (Multiplication: M = 93.9%, SE = 1.5%; 
Addition: M = 95.0%, SE = 1.2%) and comparable to the pre-scan task outside the scanner 
(Multiplication: M = 93.9%, SE = 0.8%; Addition: M = 98.5%, SE = 0.2%). Average response-times were 
in fact faster than those seen for the pre-scan behavioral task (Multiplication-pre-scan: M = 1150msec, 
SE = 61msec; Multiplication-in-scan: M = 681msec, SE = 19msec; Addition-pre-scan: M = 908msec, SE 
= 33msec; Addition-in-scan: M = 680msec, SE = 20msec), which is what one would expect if participants 
were computing the answer during presentation of the problem (2600msec) prior to appearance of 
the (occasional) verification probe. Further evidence that participants were engaging with the task as 
instructed is the presence of problem-size effects in the neural data (see Results). That is, because 
fMRI analyses focused exclusively on the calculation period (prior to response), it is difficult to explain 
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how a problem-size effect could have been observed during this period if participants were simply 
ignoring problem presentation and waiting until the sporadic presentation of response options to 
engage with the task. 
fMRI Data Acquisition and Preprocessing 
Images were collected with a 3T Siemens Magnetom Trio MRI system (Siemens Medical Systems, 
Erlangen, Germany) using a 32-channel radio frequency head coil. Participants were positioned 
headfirst and supine in the magnet bore. Subjects were instructed to move their heads as little as 
possible throughout the entire scanning session. A whole-brain high-resolution anatomical scan was 
acquired using a standard 3D MPRAGE sequence (voxel size = 1mm3). Functional images were collected 
using an echo-planar imaging (EPI) sequence: TR = 2600msec, TE = 28msec, flip angle = 80°. In-plane 
resolution was 3.3mm2 in a 64 × 64 matrix; slice thickness was 3.3 mm (44 slices, ascending-interleaved 
acquisition, no skip between slices), yielded a net field of view of 211.2 × 211.2 × 145.2mm, comprised 
of 3.3mm3 isometric voxels. 
Structural and functional images were analyzed using Brain Voyager QX 20.4 (Brain Innovation, 
Maastricht, Holland). Functional data were interpolated to 3mm3 in size. Next, they were corrected for 
slice scan-timing using cubic spline interpolation, followed by 3D motion-correction (trilinear/sinc 
interpolation), and then high-pass filtered using a GLM procedure with a Fourier basis set. Excessive 
motion was deemed net drift > 3mm in a given run or > 1.5mm sudden movement; participants with 
runs exceeding these criteria were removed from analysis (n = 4). Participants’ functional images were 
then co-registered to their respective anatomical scans using 12-parameter gradient-based affine 
alignment, and anatomical images were co-registered into Talairach space (Talairach & Tournoux, 
1988). For univariate analyses, functional data were spatially smoothed at 3mm FWHM; for 
multivariate (RSA) analyses, unsmoothed data were used in order not to contaminate the patterns of 
activation across voxels. Multivariate analyses were conducted using Matlab (2016a). Our a priori 
whole-brain univariate statistical threshold was an uncorrected voxel-wise threshold of p < .001, 
subsequently cluster-corrected for multiple comparisons using a Monte Carlo simulation procedure 
(Forman et al., 1995) at α < .01.  
For both the behavioral and univariate imaging analyses, to equate the number of trials in each 
bin, we defined small problems as having both operands smaller in the range 1-4 and large problems 
having both operands in the range 6-9 (in keeping with previous studies; e.g. Campbell & Graham, 
1985; Prado et al., 2011). Dichotomizing problem size in this manner allowed us to characterize 
behavioral/neural responses first within each category before contrasting between categories. This 
also aligned better with the RSA approach (described below). 
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RSA Analysis 
Region of Interest (ROI) Selection 
Our aim was to assess in what manner the underlying neural patterns were modulated by problem 
size, thereby potentially allowing us to distinguish between representation- and process-based 
accounts of the PSE. A reasonable precondition for distinguishing between accounts would be to 
establish whether a given region demonstrates sensitivity to relative problem size in the first place – 
i.e., via a standard univariate contrast.  
A major advantage of this approach is that it significantly reduces the need for reverse 
inference in interpreting the RSA results in regions known (in this dataset) to be sensitive to the 
primary effect of theoretical interest: the PSE. By analogy, it would seem odd to examine the neural 
underpinnings of a behavioral ‘effect’ that was not actually present in the behavioral data, which is a 
distinct possibility when using a searchlight approach to RSA. To see this, one can imagine a searchlight 
analysis that yielded several regions showing a hypothesized similarity result. However, if only a subset 
of regions show a univariate PSE, how, then, should one interpret the regions showing a significant 
RSA PSE but not a univariate PSE? A standard response is to rely (implicitly or explicitly) on reverse 
inference, but we do not condone that practice as a primary method of drawing meaningful 
conclusions about cognitive theory. Because our goal was to use neural data to distinguish between 
different theoretical views, here we elected to restrict RSA for a given operation to regions showing a 
significant PSE (in either direction) for that operation via a whole-brain univariate contrast. This also 
allowed us to situate our univariate results with respect to those already published. 
Furthermore, beyond the clear theoretical motivation outlined above, it is also important to 
point out that our univariate-to-multivariate approach does not constitute ‘double-dipping’. First, from 
a theoretical standpoint, the questions being asked by the two analyses are distinct: the univariate 
contrast assesses whether a region is sensitive to relative problem size; the RSA analyses assess in what 
manner this sensitivity manifests. Second, this approach is not statistically biased. The ROIs are being 
identified via a within-subjects contrast between large (averaged together) and small (averaged 
together) problems. Because a within-subjects contrast takes into account the correlation between 
conditions, it is the case that one would expect to see inflated correlations between small and large 
problems. However, there is no reason to assume inflated correlations within problems of a given 
condition – i.e., small~small and large~large correlations. Most crucially, there is still less (statistical) 
reason to expect that the correlations within one condition should systematically differ from those 
within the other condition – i.e., that small~small correlations should be greater than large~large 
correlations, or vice versa. In this way, the ROI selection here is both theoretically driven and, crucially, 
not a form of ‘double-dipping’. 
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RSA Model 
An important prerequisite for this set of analyses is to assess similarity between problems within a 
given category (e.g., within small addition problems). This allows one to compute PSEs (large-addition 
similarity versus small-addition similarity). To assess similarity within a given category, one could 
compute the similarity between each pair of problems in that category (1 + 1 ~ 1 + 2, 1 + 2 ~ 1 + 3, etc.) 
and then average over these similarity value estimates (r-values). Each stimulus (problem) was 
presented only once in the current dataset, so to analyze each stimulus separately would require us to 
rely on activity estimates based on a single event. Similarity computations between individual events 
were therefore likely to carry a substantial amount of noise. Thus, we adopted a different approach 
based on the ‘operand families’ method developed by LeFevre and Morris (1999) that involves binning 
responses according to a specific operand value (similar to ‘times tables’). Within each operation, we 
created a predictor that included all problems/events involving all that operand (e.g., ‘Addition-9’, or 
‘A09’: 9 + 0, 9 + 1, 9 + 2… 9 + 10). We then used this predictor to extract average intensity values (for 
a given subject) that included all 21 addition events which involved a 9 in any fashion. This approach 
significantly increases the precision of our activity estimates for each operand as it now comprises 21 
events instead of just one event. The end result, for each operation, was 11 activity estimates 
corresponding to the operands 0-10 (which we write, for addition, ‘A00’, ‘A01’…’A10’; for 
multiplication, ‘M00’, ‘M01’…’M10’). In this way, we generated activity estimates in each voxel for 
each predictor. In a given ROI, we extracted and vectorized the distributed activity pattern across 
functional voxels for each predictor. We then correlated these vectors (e.g., ‘M00’, ‘M01’…’M10’) with 
one another to generate an 11×11 correlation matrix. For present purposes, we were interested in 
PSEs, and to keep these analyses consistent with the behavioral and univariate analyses above, we 
then averaged similarity estimates between operands within each size category (small: 1~2, 1~3…3~4; 
large: 6~7, 6~8…8~9; we took only the lower triangle in each case given matrix symmetricity over the 
main diagonal). The above process was repeated for each subject separately. In this way, for each 
subject, we extracted within-category similarity estimates for each operation (addition, multiplication) 
at each size (small, large). Statistical tests were performed by comparing Fisher-z-transformed r-values 
(large – small) across 24 subjects. 
One potential downside of this approach is that, for within operation similarity estimates, a 
pair of predictors/operands shared 2 of their 21 respective events. For example, the ‘A01’ and ‘A02’ 
both contain ‘2 + 1’ and ‘1 + 2’. This will of course modestly inflate expected correlation (similarity) 
values above an expected mean value of 0. First, this inflation should impact all similarity values equally 
because all pairs of predictors/operands shared exactly 2 events; thus comparing similarity values 
against one another should not be biased by this inflation factor. On the other hand, comparing 
similarity values against 0 (i.e., to test if similarity in a given category differs from chance), will indeed 
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be biased. To correct for this, we ran 100,000 simulations assuming the same parameters as the 
current dataset but with randomly generated values instead, and found an average inflation factor of 
.093 (r-values were .093, on average, instead of the expected value of 0). Hence, .093 was subtracted 
from all within-operation similarity estimates. Complete similarity matrices can be found in 
Supplementary Information. 
Another point is that these operand-based predictors contained information from both small 
and large problems. For instance, A01 contained information from 1 + 8 and 9 + 1. However, this in 
fact works against our hypotheses, as it should reduce the likelihood of finding a statistically significant 
PSE; by making our predictors a priori more similar in terms of size, finding differences in similarity as 
a function of size is thus made more difficult. Finally, we also demonstrate the validity of this modeling 
approach by using it to recompute the behavioral results (see Figure 1), which showed very similar 
PSEs to those found using the more traditional approach described above. 
 
RESULTS 
Behavioral Results 
Traditional Approach 
As expected for such simple arithmetic problems, accuracy on all operations was near ceiling (all 
problems: M = 96%, SE < .01%; addition: M = 98%, SE < .01%; multiplication: M = 94%, SE = .01%). Thus, 
we focus here instead on reaction times (RTs), which are summarized in Table 1. The problem size 
effect (PSE) was highly significant for both multiplication (Large–Small: M = 719.03msec, SE = 95.66; 
t(23) = 7.52, p < .001, d = 1.53) and addition (Large–Small: M = 257.39msec; SE = 149.91; t(23) = 8.41, 
p < .001, d = 1.72).  
Table 1: Pre-Scan RTs 
 Small Large  
Addition 781 (29) 1038 (45) 
Multiplication 830 (30) 1549 (113) 
Note: Mean reaction times (msec) and standard errors in parentheses. 
 
Operand-Bin Method 
To verify the operand-bin model used for the RSA model (see Methods), we binned behavioral RT data 
(pre-scan behavioral task) using this method. Figure 1 shows these data below. To calculate PSEs, we 
computed each individual participant’s regression slope with RT as dependent variable and Operand 
Size (0-10) as the predictor. We then used a one-sample t-test on these slopes (betas) across 
participants (N = 24). This procedure was repeated for each operation separately. The results showed 
that there was a highly significant positive slope for both operations: Multiplication: t(23) = 8.01, p = 
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4E-08; Addition: t(23) = 8.37, p = 2E-08. Thus, behavioral data analyzed in the same manner as the RSA 
data yielded PSEs highly comparable to the more traditional means of computing PSEs used in the main 
text. This indicates the operand-bin model is capable of detecting the influence of problem-size (an 
assumption critical to the RSA approach adopted here). 
Figure 1: RT data using the operand-bin model. 
 
Figure 1 shows RT data modelled via the operand-bin method (identical to that used in the RSA model). 
Values here are averaged across participants. Error-bars indicate standard-errors. 
 
 
Univariate fMRI Results 
Multiplication 
A standard voxel-wise GLM was run with separate predictors for small and large multiplication and 
addition. Small and large predictors comprised trials in the same manner as the behavioral results 
(other trials and response events were modeled as events of no interest). Brain areas that showed a 
PSE were identified for multiplication and addition separately by contrasting Large and Small 
predictors (agnostic to direction).  
For multiplication, significant PSEs (large > small) were identified in a network including 
bilateral intraparietal sulci (IPS), left ventral temporal-occipital junction (LTOJv), multiple prefrontal 
regions, and several subcortical regions including dorsal striatum and cerebellum. Regions are shown 
in Figure 2, and a complete list of regions – along with region details, abbreviations and activity 
estimates – can be found in Table 2. Note that several very large regions clearly spanned multiple 
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cortical areas; these were each split into sub-regions using a standard k-means clustering algorithm 
(Lloyd, 1982) based on Talairach coordinates2. No regions showed the reverse pattern (small > large). 
 
Table 2: Univariate PSE Region Details – Multiplication 
 Talairach Coordinates Size Beta Estimates 
Region x y z (mm3) Large Small 
LDLPFC -42.3 14.2 29.4 4803 .56 (.07) .00 (.06) 
RDLPFC 42.3 8.4 30.4 541 .44 (.07) -.04 (.07) 
LINSa -31.4 18.4 6.6 4139 .52 (.07) -.08 (.05) 
RINSa 34.1 19.0 4.9 4020 .50 (.07) -.08 (.05) 
LSFSa -31.9 51.8 19.9 498 .33 (.07) -.10 (.06) 
RSFSa 31.2 46.6 22.8 578 .34 (.07) -.06 (.06) 
LFEF -28.1 -2.6 55.4 696 .53 (.07) .03 (.05) 
LIPSa -34.0 -45.9 42.1 3680 .73 (.06) .16 (.06) 
LIPSp -24.1 -63.5 42.9 4545 .78 (.08) .17 (.06) 
RIPSp 27.7 -56.8 43.2 3017 .53 (.06) .03 (.06) 
LPRC -6.9 -68.7 41.3 695 .39 (.08) -.11 (.07) 
LTOJv -46.8 -60.1 -6.4 1071 .58 (.07) .16 (.06) 
ACCd 1.3 19.4 34.2 5548 .50 (.06) -.04 (.05) 
PreSMA -0.1 8.8 49.5 4155 .73 (.09) .09 (.05) 
PCC -1.4 -23.4 27.0 924 .38 (.05) -.08 (.07) 
LSTRId -15.2 5.3 7.0 2305 .47 (.05) .01 (.07) 
RSTRId 15.0 7.0 8.7 1555 .50 (.06) .05 (.07) 
LTHALdm -10.7 -6.1 14.7 1841 .38 (.05) -.07 (.06) 
RTHALdm 9.4 -6.5 10.2 802 .34 (.05) -.08 (.06) 
RCBMd 30.6 -59.9 -20.9 1530 .52 (.06) .05 (.06) 
RCBMv 29.4 -62.0 -38.9 787 .47 (.07) -.06 (.05) 
MCBMp 2.99 -73.8 -18.9 2228 .34 (.06) -.09 (.05) 
Note: Region Abbreviations: leading L=Left, leading R=right, leading 
M=middle; a=anterior, p=posterior, d=dorsal, v=ventral, m=medial; 
DLPFC=dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, INS=insula, SFS=superior frontal 
sulcus, FEF=frontal eye field, IPS=intraparietal sulcus, PRC=precuneus, 
TOJ=temporal-occipital junction, ACC=anterior cingulate cortex, 
PreSMA=pre-supplementary motor area, PCC=posterior cingulate cortex, 
STRI=striatum, THAL=thalamus, CBM=cerebellum. 
                                                 
2 Regions split in this way were as follows: a large frontal midline region was split into pre-supplementary motor 
area (PreSMA) and dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (ACCd); a large region running the length of the left IPS was 
split into anterior (LIPSa) and posterior (LIPSp) regions; large bilateral subcortical regions were each split into 
dorsal striatum (STRId) and dorso-medial thalamus (THALdm). 
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Figure 2: Univariate PSE Regions – Multiplication 
 
Figure 2 shows whole-brain univariate PSE Regions for Multiplication. See Table 2 for 
region abbreviations. All regions: Large > Small. 
 
Addition 
For addition, no regions showed a significant PSE using the more conservative a priori whole-brain 
threshold (voxelwise p < .001, cluster-corrected at α < .01). However, several regions were significant 
at the slightly more liberal threshold of voxelwise p < .005, cluster-corrected at α < .01. Because (1) 
our primary focus was not on the univariate but the RSA results, and (2) this slightly more liberal 
threshold is still not unreasonable in the field (Cunningham & Koscik, 2017; Slotnick, 2017), we deemed 
it advisable to avoid a potentially obvious Type II error and so proceeded with this lower threshold for 
these addition problems. Still, caution may be warranted when interpreting the results for addition. 
Several regions showed a standard PSE (large > small) for addition, including PreSMA and bilateral IPS 
and LTOJv. Note that each of these regions overlapped with similar regions seen for multiplication. 
Two regions showed a reversal of the PSE (small > large): left AGd and RIFGa. Regions are shown in 
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Figure 3, and a complete list of regions – along with region details, abbreviations and activity estimates 
– can be found in Table 3. 
Figure 3: Univariate PSE Regions – Addition 
 
Figure 3 shows whole-brain univariate PSE Regions for Addition. See Table 3 for region 
abbreviations. Orange: large>small; blue: small>large. 
 
Table 3: Univariate PSE Region Details – Addition 
 Talairach Coordinates Size Beta Estimates 
Region x y z (mm3) Large Small 
LIPSa -42.8 -34.2 46.1 572 .50 (.07) .11 (.06) 
LIPSp -28.3 -54.0 49.0 1034 .49 (.07) .12 (.06) 
RIPSp 26.2 -56.7 49.0 686 .39 (.07) .01 (.06) 
LTOJv -47.3 -53.9 -8.1 401 .38 (.08) .02 (.05) 
PreSMA 1.4 6.5 49.2 645 .43 (.06) .08 (.06) 
LAGd -52.3 -42.0 38.7 493 -.24 (.05) .08 (.05) 
RIFGa 44.7 42.7 7.9 403 -.30 (.06) .06 (.05) 
Note: Region Abbreviations: leading L=Left, leading R=right; a=anterior, 
p=posterior, d=dorsal, v=ventral; IPS=intraparietal sulcus, TOJ=temporal-
occipital junction, PreSMA=pre-supplementary motor area, AG=angular 
gyrus, IFG=inferior frontal gyrus. 
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Representational Similarity Analysis (RSA) Results 
In this section, we assessed similarity within each small and large condition (separately, for 
multiplication and addition). By contrasting the relative similarity among large problems with the 
similarity between small problems, we thus tested whether the regions showing a significant 
univariate PSE exhibited similarity patterns more consistent with a representation- or process-based 
account of the PSE. RSA for a given operation was conducted in the corresponding regions from the 
previous section (i.e., those in Table 2 for multiplication and those in Table 3 for addition). Because r-
values are bounded between -1 and 1 and are not normally distributed, all statistical tests are 
computed over Fisher-z-transformed r-values [z=atanh(r), values reported in Figures 4a and 5a are thus 
z-values as well]. Finally, here we adopt a more network-based view in that arithmetic is best 
characterized by a network of regions working in concert (Menon, 2015). Furthermore, the primary 
goal of the present paper was to use neuroimaging data to distinguish between two classes of 
theoretical explanations formulated at the cognitive level for a behavioral and neural (univariate) 
phenomenon. For these reasons, and to protect against reverse inference, we focus on overall patterns 
of results as opposed to interpreting each ROI in isolation. 
 Figure 4a shows RSA results for multiplication. In all 22 regions, large~large similarity tended 
to be higher than small~small similarity. Figure 4b shows results from directly contrasting large and 
small similarity values (shown as effect-sizes). 21 of 22 regions showed a significant large > small 
similarity-based PSE at p < .05 (higher than the dotted line in Figure 4b), and 17 of 22 regions showed 
an effect that was significant at the more stringent threshold of p < .0023 (higher than the bold dashed 
line in Figure 4b; this p-value was determined by correcting for 22 comparisons via the Dunn- Šidák 
method; Šidák, 1967). The probability of 21 of 22 regions obtaining significance at p < .05 by chance is 
roughly 1E-26; the probability of 17 of 22 regions obtaining significance at p < .0023 by chance is 
roughly 4E-41. We thus consider the evidence in favor of the representation-based account of the PSE 
in multiplication to be strong.  
Figure 5a shows RSA results for addition. Results for addition were far less conclusive than for 
multiplication. In just 2 of the 7 regions was large~large similarity significantly higher than small~small 
similarity. Further, Figure 5b shows that these two regions, LTOJv and RIFGa, showed a similarity-based 
PSE that only passed only the more liberal threshold of p < .05. The probability of 2 of 7 regions 
obtaining significance at p < .05 by chance is .041, which, while significant, is perhaps underwhelming. 
Moreover, one of the two regions (RIFGa) in fact showed a reversed PSE in the univariate results, which 
somewhat clouds the interpretation of the PSE in the RSA results. Furthermore, it is worth 
remembering that the univariate addition PSE was revealed only once we lowered the threshold. We 
thus consider the evidence in favor of the representation-based account of the PSE in addition to be 
somewhere between marginal and unconvincing. 
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Figure 4: Similarity-Based PSE – Multiplication 
 
Caption: Figure 4a shows multiplication large~large and small~small similarity values (Fisher-z values). 
Figure 4b shows the similarity-based PSE (large – small) expressed as effect-sizes (d). Dotted line: p = .05; 
bold dashed line: p = .0023 (correcting for 22 comparisons). 
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Figure 5: Similarity-based PSE – Addition 
 
Caption: Figure 5a shows addition large~large and small~small similarity values (Fisher-z values). Figure 
5b shows the similarity-based PSE (large – small) expressed as effect-sizes (d). Dotted line: p = .05; bold 
dashed line: p = .0023 (correcting for 22 comparisons). 
 
Post-hoc RSA 
Our main conclusion from the previous section was that the PSE in multiplication is best explained by 
a representation-based account, wherein smaller problems are represented more distinctly (lower 
similarity) relative to larger problems (higher similarity). That said, even within the representation-
based view of the PSE, there is not always agreement about the ultimate source of the PSE, as one 
could further distinguish between memory-based and magnitude-based versions of representation-
centered accounts of the PSE. Memory-based accounts place explanatory emphasis on the frequency 
of input and, relatedly, the order in which the input is learned; in other words, the quality of retrieval 
association between stimulus and response. Smaller problems are encountered more frequently and 
learned earlier, and so the quality (in the form of narrower or more ‘peaked’ distributions) of 
associations is higher relative to large problems, which are encountered less frequently and learned 
later, thus incurring lower quality (broader and more overlapping) associations (e.g., Ashcraft, 1987; 
Ashcraft & Christy, 1995; De Visscher & Noël, 2014; McCloskey & Lindemann, 1992; Siegler & Shrager, 
1984). Magnitude-based accounts place explanatory emphasis on the magnitudes of the quantities in 
question: the neural encoding of larger quantities occurs via neural tuning curves that are wider and 
thus less finely tuned than the neural encoding of smaller quantities, which have more exact (narrower 
and less overlapping) neural tuning curves (e.g., Nieder & Dehaene, 2009; Campbell, 1995). Note that 
both accounts are representation-based (one focusing on the strength and specificity of the memory-
association-trace and the other focusing on numerical magnitude), and both predict the similarity-
based PSE observed for multiplication in the previous section. Knowing the results of the previous 
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section, is there a post-hoc test capable of distinguishing between memory- and magnitude-based 
accounts? 
 To answer this question, it is informative to look at the multiplication problems involving the 
operand 10 (‘ten-problems’). In the behavioral data using the operand-bin model (see Figure 1), 
multiplication shows a steep slope (the larger the operand, the larger the reaction time); however, the 
slope drops quite sharply at the operand-bin ‘10’. Thus, these ‘ten-problems’ are performed better 
than any other of the large operand-bins (ranging from 6 to 9). Multiplication problems including a ‘10’ 
(e.g., 4 x 10) are often solved via direct memory retrieval. Hence, these problems tend to be performed 
faster and less erroneously than problems with other operands (e.g., Hinault, tiberghien, & Lemaire, 
2015; Lemaire & Reder, 1999; Siegler, 1988). Given that these problems have exceptional patterns of 
behavioral performance relative to other problems, the question is thus how ten-problems manifest 
at the neural level.  
More specifically, if a given problem’s representation is purely based on the underlying 
problem magnitude, then the similarity between ten-problems and the problems we previously 
classified as ‘large’ (6-9) should be just as high if not higher than that seen for large~large similarity 
values computed in the previous section. In contrast, a memory-based representation account would 
emphasize repeated practice with operand-10 problems that leads to highly distinct memory traces 
for these problems. Akin to what was observed for small problems above, a memory-based view would 
predict lower similarity between ten-problems and ‘large’ problems relative to large~large similarity 
values.  
To test this explicitly, as in the previous section, large problems were an average of the 
correlations of problems with operands 6 – 9 within a participant. Ten-problems were an average of 
the correlations between operand-10 problems and the other large operands (operand-6 through 
operand-9), again computed within a participant. Average similarity values (z-transformed r-values) 
for ‘Large’ and ‘Ten’ problems are shown in Figure 6a (orange and blue bars, respectively). Next, we 
directly contrasted these values using a paired sample t-tests (Large – Ten); results are shown as effect-
sizes in Figure 6b. 
 From Figure 6a, it is evident that the similarity between ten-problems and large-problems 
tended to be relatively low – in fact lower than large-large similarity values in all 22 regions. Looking 
at the direct contrast in Figure 6b, 20 of 22 regions showed a significant large > ten difference (higher 
than the dotted line in Figure 6b), and 18 of 22 regions showed an effect that was significant at the 
more stringent threshold of p < .0023 (higher than the bold dashed line in Figure 6b). The probability 
of 20 of 22 regions obtaining significance at p < .05 by chance is roughly 2E-24; the probability of 18 of 
22 regions obtaining significance at p < .0023 by chance is roughly 2E-44. We thus consider the 
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evidence in favor of the memory-based (as opposed to the magnitude-based) representational account 
of the PSE in multiplication to be strong.  
Figure 6: Assessing ‘Ten Problems’ 
 
Caption: Figure 6a shows multiplication large~large and ten~large similarity values (Fisher-z values). 
Figure 6b shows the contrast (large – ten) expressed as effect-sizes (d). Dotted line: p = .05; bold dashed 
line: p = .0023 (correcting for 22 comparisons). 
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DISCUSSION 
The problem size effect (PSE) in arithmetic is one of the most robust effects in mathematical cognition 
(e.g., Ashcraft, 1992; Zbrodoff & Logan, 2005) where arithmetic performance tends to be better for 
numerically small- relative to large-problems, and neural activity estimated in a univariate fashion 
tends to be higher for large relative to small-problems (Menon, 2015). The PSE is generally explained 
through two different accounts: a representation-based and a process-based account. By means of 
representational similarity analyses, we sought to disentangle the two accounts.  
One type of explanation tends to focus on how a given item is stored or represented in 
memory, and on the various factors that impact this memory trace. One such explanation highlights 
the frequency with which arithmetic problems are taught in school. More frequently taught problems 
(i.e., small problems) are predicted to have a higher strength of representation. By contrast, large 
problems are stored in memory with lower strength, which results in slower and more erroneous 
responses (Ashcraft, 1987; Ashcraft & Christy, 1995; McCloskey & Lindemann, 1992). In a similar vein, 
Siegler and Shrager (1984) suggested that problems with a lesser history of error (e.g., smaller 
problems) will have a more peaked ‘distribution of associations’, leading to a larger likelihood of 
retrieving the correct answer. Large problems will have a more widely spread distribution of 
associations (a given stimulus is linked to a greater number of answers or outputs with a broader or 
less peaked distribution around the correct answer). Problems with a widely-spread distribution of 
associations are solved more slowly and more erroneously because the correct answer is likely to 
achieve retrieval threshold less efficiently. In a computationally similar model, the network 
interference model by Campbell (1995) also explains the PSE by means of representations, but via 
representations of magnitude. Large magnitudes have broader distributions which are present when 
solving arithmetic problems. These broader distributions lead to greater representational overlap 
which in turn results in greater interference – and hence worse performance – on large relative to 
small problems. 
A second type of explanation for the PSE tends to focus on the various processes – typically in 
the form of different strategies – that are used to solve small and large problems. A prominent example 
of this type of explanation focuses expressly on strategic variation (LeFevre et al., 1996; Campbell & 
Xue, 2001). In this view, small problems tend to rely on similar processing strategies (e.g., retrieval), 
whereas large problems require a more diverse set of processing strategies (e.g., estimation, 
calculation, transformation, etc.). The reduced efficiency and increased variability of strategies for 
large problems leads to poorer performance. In a similar vein, Campbell and Xue (2001) argued that 
there are three strategy-related sources of the PSE: (1) less frequent retrieval use for large relative to 
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small problems, (2) lower retrieval efficiency (i.e., speed and accuracy) for large relative to small 
problems and (3) lower procedural efficiency for large relative to small problems.  
 Behavioral approaches have struggled to distinguish between these two accounts, and, to 
date, the neural basis of the PSE has been examined more or less exclusively using univariate 
approaches which tend to show results that more or less mirror the behavioral results (e.g., regions 
showing differences in activity as a function of problem size (e.g., De Smedt et al., 2011; Jost et al., 
2011; Grabner et al., 2013; Prado et al, 2013). Moreover, interpretations of these activity differences 
as they pertain to specific cognitive explanations underlying the outward effects (behavioral or neural) 
have largely been driven by reverse inference, which is highly problematic when interpreting fMRI data 
(Poldrack, 2006, 2011). Thus, it is unclear how such univariate-based approaches might notably shift 
the needle with respect to distinguishing between representation- and process-based accounts of the 
PSE.  
Using an RSA-based approach, our data clearly provided evidence for a representation-based 
account (and against a process-based account) of the PSE in multiplication by showing higher similarity 
among large relative to small problems. According to this view, large problems should have more 
overlapping (and thus more similar) distributions. Specifically, greater similarity for large problems 
indicates that large problems may be less distinguished from one another in terms of their respective 
neural patterns. Further evidence that multiplication processing is characterized by the representation 
and retrieval of specific memory traces (memory-based account) was seen in that large multiplication 
problems showed little or no similarity with ten-problems. This is presumably because these problems 
can be solved by means of retrieval that can override the underlying magnitude (e.g., Hinault, 
tiberghien, & Lemaire, 2015; Lemaire & Reder, 1999; Masse & Lemaire, 2001; Siegler, 1988). In other 
words, ten-problems failed to follow the standard problem-size progression one would expect based 
on magnitude alone, thus essentially serving as the ‘exception that proves the rule’. Multiplication 
problems are stored as individual representations which typically become less distinct as problem-size 
increases; but some large problems that can be solved via special rules or that occur much more 
frequently than expected based on their size can break this trend, and in that case, they are 
represented quite distinctly even with respect to other large multiplication problems.  
On a broader scale, we contend that these data provide an example of how modern 
neuroimaging techniques may contribute to distinguishing between competing cognitive models for 
explaining human behavior, even after largely removing reverse inference from the table. An 
interesting upshot of this perspective is that it requires one to think of the neural data as a dependent 
variable that must stand on its own merit, and not something that is somehow privileged simply 
because the data are derived from a neural source per se. Here, merit arises because, when analyzed 
in a particular fashion, the data afford an opportunity to distinguish between competing theoretical 
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predictions not provided by other dependent variables, such as reaction time data. Demonstrating that 
this variable (in this case similarity between neural activity patterns) – clearly favored one set of 
predictions over another in an obvious majority of candidate brain regions (Figure 4) was sufficient to 
accomplish the primary aim of the study without overt recourse to reverse inference. That said, it is 
important to acknowledge that some dependent variables can be hierarchical in nature. For instance, 
functional characterization of specific brain areas highlighted here may be possible in conjunction with 
existing or future work, and doing so may be of interest especially for future studies designed expressly 
to test such functionally specific predictions in specific brain areas. 
A methodological consideration when interpreting the RSA results for multiplication is the 
possibility that greater similarity for large problems may be driven simply by the fact that some or all 
of the regions in question are not involved in processing small problems to begin with. In this view, 
there is no systematic signal associated with small problems in the regions revealed here, leading to 
similarity values close to 0, which in turn speciously drives greater apparent similarity for large relative 
to small problems. There are multiple aspects of the current data that are inconsistent with this view, 
however. First, several regions (ACCdp, LINSa, LPRC, LTHALd, MCBMp, PCC, PreSMA, RINSa, RSFSa; 
Figure 4, left) showed significant dissimilarity (negative similarity) for small problems, indicating the 
presence of systematic signal in the pattern-based data among small problems, and yet none of these 
areas showed univariate activity significantly different from (above or below) baseline (Table 2). The 
presence of systematic relations between variables within the small category is thus not dependent 
upon whether univariate responses differed significantly from baseline. Approaching the question 
from the opposite direction, several regions did show significant positive univariate activity for small 
problems (LIPSa, LIPSp, LTOJv; Table 2), and yet none of these showed significant similarity for small 
problems (Figure 4, left). Finally, for addition, we saw activity substantially different from baseline for 
large problems in all 7 regions (Table 3), and yet only 1 of the 7 (LTOJv) showed significant similarity 
among large problems (Figure 5, left). In other words, there are multiple reasons to doubt a close 
contingency between univariate activity levels and presence of sufficient signal to detect meaningful 
correlations via a similarity-based approach. 
  Finally, it is important to acknowledge that RSA results were less clear for addition. This may 
indicate that addition problems are represented with highly distinct representations and therefore 
showed no similarity (as in the representation-based account). If these problems are indeed highly 
distinct, then most of the additions are likely to be solved by retrieval. Indirect evidence favoring this 
view can also be seen in that addition RTs were closer to the range of small multiplication RTs, and 
variability (standard errors) in addition RTs was overall relatively low (also more similar to small 
multiplication problems; see Table 1 and Figure 1). However, this interpretation is admittedly 
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speculative; hence, at minimum, the current study underscores the need for future studies to take into 
account arithmetic operation when probing the neural bases of arithmetic in general. 
 To conclude, not all researchers interested in human behavior remain convinced that 
neuroscience – in particular modern neuroimaging techniques – have much to contribute to 
distinguishing between competing cognitive models for explaining human behavior (e.g., Coltheart, 
2006), an issue that becomes all the more acute once one takes seriously the notion of removing 
reverse inference from the table (Anderson, 2014). Here, we took up this challenge in an attempt to 
distinguish between competing accounts of the problem size effect (PSE) in arithmetic. Our results 
provide clear evidence in favor of a representation-based over a process-based account of the PSE in 
multiplication. Post-hoc analysis further distinguished between different accounts within the broader 
family of representation-based accounts – specifically, results favored a memory-based account of the 
PSE over a strictly magnitude-based account. For addition, results were not nearly as conclusive, 
though a cautious interpretation would slightly favor a representation-based account for addition as 
well. Because behavioral and univariate fMRI analyses can struggle to distinguish between theoretical 
accounts of the PSE in arithmetic, the fact that we found such clear evidence for a representation-
based account of the PSE in multiplication is an example of how investigating neural data can 
contribute directly to our cognitive interpretation of a well-known behavioral phenomenon. More 
broadly, this work may prove useful for understanding the origins of atypical mathematical 
development such as dyscalculia (Butterworth et al., 2011), as difficulties in arithmetic are the crucial 
feature of children with dyscalculia. 
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